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AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONS:
THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
John Fredericks Irf
INTRODUCTION
It is often said that Christopher Columbus "discovered"
America. The truth is, the territory now known as the United States
was occupied by large groups of indigenous people long before the
Europeans reached her shores. If asked, these native people will tell
you that they have occupied this land since time immemorial.'
Indeed, many native tribes have creation stories which teach that
their people first came to this land when it was covered with
water.2 These creation theories are, of course, contrary to the Euro-
anthropologists' theory that there was once a land bridge between
Asia and North America, making a one-way street by which the
people of Asia migrated to a previously empty North America.
* B.A., History, University of Montana, 1984; J.D., University of Colorado,
1987; member/partner with the law firm of Fredericks, Pelcyger & Hester, LLC,
Louisville, Colorado, specializing in federal Indian law. The author would like
to express his appreciation to Tracy Miller for her assistance in the historical
research for the Article. Special thanks also to law Professor David Getches and
history Professor Patricia Limerick of the University of Colorado for taking the
time to review and provide their insight and comments upon the initial draft of
this Article. Finally, a heartfelt thanks to my secretary, Linda Doran, for her hard
work and dedication in helping to bring this Article to fruition.
l America's indigenous people are commonly referred to as Indians due to
Columbus' mistaken belief that he had reached the East Indies (hence the term
"Indian").
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. COFFER, SPIRITS OF THE SACRED MOUNTAINS:
CREATION STORIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 74, 89-90 (1978) (relating the
creation stories of the Yakima and Kansa tribes); THE WORLD BEGINS HERE: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF OREGON SHORT FICTION 17 (Glen A. Love, ed., 1993).
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At any rate, it is undisputed that the lands which now comprise
the United States were occupied by distinct groups of native people
prior to the introduction of the first Europeans on the continent.
These distinct nations of people, referred to as "tribes" in most
texts, possessed their own unique social, cultural and political
system under which they were free to govern themselves and to
exist as a separate people. Their history is inextricably intertwined
with the history behind the creation of the United States and the
westward movement. Indian tribes today continue to possess
sovereign jurisdiction over both their members and the territory
which they occupy (commonly referred to today as Indian reserva-
tions or Indian Country).3
This Article examines Indian tribal sovereignty, its history,
what it has come to mean in the present, and what it should mean
for the future. The analysis will show that the Indian nations that
continue to exist today are distinct peoples culturally and political-
ly, and have always possessed sovereignty over both their members
and their territory-sovereignty which has survived the formation
and growth of the United States, and is recognized in the United
States Constitution, numerous treaties and the annals of history. Yet
this sovereignty, though at times recognized and protected by the
federal judiciary and Congress, has at other times been attacked by
lawyers and politicians who have either forgotten history or who
choose to ignore it.
The concept of "tribal sovereignty" is hard to define, primarily
because the pendulum-like swing of federal Indian policy since the
creation of the United States Constitution has been so inconsistent
and has affected tribal sovereignty as much as it has affected
Indian people themselves. Indeed, if one were to ask tribal leaders
to define tribal sovereignty in general, it would be impossible to
obtain a unanimous response. And yet, most would agree with
Chief Red Cloud, the great Oglala Sioux chief, who said:
The Great Spirit made us, the Indians, and gave us this
land we live in. He gave us the buffalo, the antelope, and
the deer for food and clothing. We moved on our hunting
' See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
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grounds from the Minnesota to the Platte and from the
Mississippi to the great mountains. No one put bounds on
us. We were free as the winds and eagle.4
Tribal sovereignty, then, essentially means freedom. An
independence which allows Indian people to make and be governed
by their own laws, to control the social, economic and political
forces within the territory they occupy, to practice their religion
and sustain their culture free of constraints. The various groups of
native people historically possessed absolute sovereignty in the
traditional legal sense. They governed themselves, they made war
and peace, and were essentially free to live as they saw fit. With
the arrival of the Europeans and eventual creation of the United
States, a few tribes were extinguished, a few others assimilated.
But most tribes successfully fought for and retained their separate
cultural, social and political identity, and most were able to retain
at least a portion of the territory they historically occupied.
Today there are over 500 federally recognized Indian tribes,
most of which occupy reservations with distinct boundaries that
define their territory.5 Many of these tribes still occupy reserva-
tions within their traditional homeland.6 Their fight to retain their
sovereignty, which historically took the form of warfare and treaty
making, continues today in the halls of Congress, in the courts and
through the power of civil demonstration.' These tribes have
survived the onslaught of the westward movement under the
naturalistic theory of "manifest destiny;" they have survived wars,
prejudice, disease, and the destruction of their food sources; and
most notably, they have survived the imposition of over 200 years
of inconsistent and at times brutal and inhumane federal policy and
4 AMERICAN INDIAN QUOTATIONS 58 (Howard J. Langer ed., 1996).
' DAvID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 8 (3d ed. 1993).
6 There are some exceptions of course. Most notable are some of the Indian
tribes currently residing in Oklahoma, which previously were removed from their
traditional eastern homelands with the expansion of white settlers west from the
original thirteen colonies.
7 See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN
TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974) [hereinafter
DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES].
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corrupt bureaucrats. Felix S. Cohen, the acknowledged expert on
Indian law and policy, was certainly correct when he described the
history of America's federal Indian policy:
Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our
treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith
8
It is a tribute to the endurance of America's first nations that
they have survived the various political shifts in congressional
policy and judicial decision-making, and that they have clung to
their sovereignty and their right to exist as separate political
communities within the United States. This Article will illustrate
that, with the exception of the federal policy supporting tribal self-
government, every single federal Indian policy, from attempted
assimilation to termination, has failed miserably. These federal
policies have failed primarily because of resistance from the Indian
tribes themselves, and their steadfast refusal to part with what
remains of their land base and their sovereignty. These policies also
failed because the Indian tribes had the support of a number of
dedicated policymakers who understood history, the Indians'
perspective, and the importance of abiding by the United States'
treaty obligations. In the end, these policies failed because they
simply could not be morally justified by any civilized democratic
society concerned with the preservation of basic human rights.
Part I of this Article will trace the historical origins and
evolution of tribal sovereignty from pre-colonial time through the
present. This Part will explain how the United States' political
climate has influenced the development and/or diminishment of
tribal sovereignty, and how the lack of a meaningful and consistent
federal policy protecting tribal sovereignty has resulted in the
weakening of the Indian tribes' social, political and cultural
structures.
Part II of this Article will discuss the present condition of tribal
sovereignty, focusing on the legal limitations that have been placed
8 F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW v (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982).
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on sovereignty by Congress and the courts, including the current
trend of the Supreme Court to limit the territorial exercise of tribal
sovereignty-a trend supported by some members of Congress.
This Part will also suggest measures Indian tribes and tribal
governments can take to stop this renewed effort to erode their
historic right to occupy and govern within the remnants of their
territory.
Finally, in Part III, this Article will explain why it would be
disastrous for Congress to once again shift away from its current
policy of promoting tribal self-government. Maintaining and
actually enforcing the current federal policy is particularly
important because Indian tribes are just now becoming familiar
with the rules governing their effort to incorporate and adopt a new
system of government that is in many ways foreign to their
traditional ways. They are continuously learning how to survive in
the world of capitalism, and have in the past twenty-five years
made great strides in business and economic development. With
this advancement comes increased regulation, and the need to
exercise jurisdiction in areas previously left unregulated. The
increased regulation by tribes seeking social and economic
advancement often results in disputes between tribes and non-
Indians either residing or doing business in Indian country. The
result has been increasing attacks on sovereignty itself. This Article
will show that the continued preservation of tribal sovereignty is
critical to the continued advancement of America's first nations.
Hopefully, lawyers, judges, and lawmakers at local, state and
national levels will recognize that tribal sovereignty is the founda-
tion upon which Indian tribes can revitalize their communities,
engage in constructive commerce with their non-Indian neighbors,
and become self-sufficient political entities within our constitutional
scheme.
The focus throughout this Article will be on the government-to-
government relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes-a relationship founded upon early treaties, and later upon
laws and executive orders continuously recognizing the right of the
Indian tribes to occupy their own distinct territory. The ultimate
goal is to provide a historical and legal understanding of tribal
sovereignty, and to explain the basis upon which tribes exist as
sovereigns within the framework of the Constitution and laws and
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why their sovereignty must be protected. From this understanding
should come the recognition that a return to the assimila-
tion/termination policies of the past, by which its proponents have
attempted to destroy Indian sovereignty, is legally and morally
wrong.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Federal Indian law is informed by many academic disciplines,
but "[p]robably the most significant source ... is history."9 Many
of today's policy makers, lawyers and judges forget that the
sovereignty of this country's Indian tribes has a unique historical
basis which must inform their present day status. The failure to
understand history is the primary reason why so many fail to
understand why tribal sovereignty exists at all.
A. Early History: Colonization, the Constitution and the
Indian Treaties
From pre-colonial times to approximately 1870, tribal sover-
eignty was expressly recognized in numerous treaties between the
British, the colonists and later the United States, and the various
Indian tribes with whom they came in contact. When the Constitu-
tion was drafted and ratified, and for over a century following, the
native Indian tribes who occupied their own territory were military
forces to be reckoned with. The European countries exploring the
New World, including England, sought the tribes as allies in their
wars with each other over the right to occupy the New World.
When the colonists declared their independence and drafted the
Constitution, the Indian tribes to the north, south and west of the
original colonies were considered sovereign powers, to be dealt
with on a government-to-government basis.
Of course, the Indians did not take part in drafting the Constitu-
tion, so the Constitution, not surprisingly, does not expressly
mention Indian sovereignty. Nor does it deal with the natives' prior
9 COHEN, supra note 8, at 48.
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title to the land the colonists occupied. Instead, the Constitution is
dominated by two major concerns: "the allocation of governmental
authority between the federal and state sovereigns and the distribu-
tion of federal authority within the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of [the federal] government."' Nevertheless,
America's first nations were given express constitutional recogni-
tion in the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to
"regulate [c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."" Because there were many
powerful Indian tribes who constituted a real threat to the young
United States, it is no coincidence that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution places Indian tribes alongside foreign nations and the
various states within the constitutional framework.
Tribal sovereignty also finds implicit recognition in the treaty
clause of the Constitution, which gives the President the power to
make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. 12 At the
time the Constitution was created, it was common practice for the
colonists to execute treaties with the Indian tribes, so it is not hard
to conclude that the treaty clause was drafted with the Indians in
mind.
This country's native people were organized socially, politically
and economically prior to the drafting of the Constitution and long
before the Europeans arrived on the continent. 3 The first visitors
to the New World encountered many nations of native people. The
Chesapeake Bay region was characterized as "densely populated
with towns of independent nations ... well supported by farming,
hunting, fishing, and ... gathering."' 4 Spanish explorers met the
Zuni in the Southwest and commented on the "rich, watered fields
10 Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportuni-
ties and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 314
(1997).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2/d. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2.
13 See CHARLES F. WILKINsON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW
100 (1987).
14 ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATIONS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 181 (1994).
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and numerous settled towns amply stocked with food and sup-
plies.""5 The Iroquois Confederacy of the Northeast possessed a
constitution known as The Great Peace Pact. It contained "practi-
cally all the safeguards which have been raised in historic
parliaments to protect home affairs from centralized authority, and
to insure internal peace without domestic tyranny."' ' 6
During the early years when Europe was exploring America,
legal scholars were debating the rights of the native people the
explorers encountered, particularly the tribes' prior claim to the
land. Spanish legal theorist Franciscus de Victoria (1480-1546) laid
the foundation for his country's colonial-era theory, based upon
humane "natural law" principles, which would later influence many
principles of international law.17 Victoria argued that the indige-
nous people of America possessed natural legal rights as free and
rational people and had inherent rights under natural law to the
territory they occupied.1 8 According to the law of nations, the
European explorers had no lawful right to dispossess the Indians of
their prior title to the land.19 By the same token, Victoria also
argued that the Indians were themselves subject to these natural
law principles, such that they could not "causelessly prevent" the
Europeans from economically exploiting the New World as long as
it could be done without injury to the tribes.2° Any disputes over
the right of the Europeans to visit and exploit the New World
could be settled by armed conflict.2"
Victoria's writings, though persuasive to many, were in many
ways at odds with the harshly stated law of discovery embraced by
the Pope and England, and later the United States. The discovery
doctrine was based on the belief that America was occupied by
"heathens and infidels"-sinners whose lands could be taken by
force and without cause. Gradually, the discovery doctrine came
'" Id. at 162.
16 ARTHUR POUND, JOHNSON OF THE MOHAWKS 68 (1930).
17 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 50-51.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 52-53.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 45-54. See also Lindsay G. Robertson, John Marshall As Colonial
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
to be recognized as the legal basis upon which the Europeans, and
later the United States, could acquire title to the Indians' land.
Upon European "discovery," it was said, (1) that fee title to the
land passed to the discovering European sovereign, and (2) that the
real property interest the tribes did possess, a so-called right of
occupancy, could be conveyed by the tribes only to the European
sovereign or successor in interest.24 Thus, the tribes were consid-
ered by proponents of the discovery doctrine to be divested of any
fee title and the right to freely alienate or sell their land to anyone
other than the European sovereign who "discovered" their land.
The discovery doctrine cannot be easily justified historically simply
because the theory was never put in practice. The Indians had
never heard of the "discovery" doctrine, and probably would have
scoffed at any notion that the Europeans obtained rights to their
territory simply by landing on the shores of America. Nevertheless,
the discovery doctrine was incorporated as federal law by Chief
Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh.26
The fallacy underlying the discovery doctrine aside, the
sovereignty of America's tribes was legally recognized well before
the founding of the United States. Indians outnumbered settlers for
"several decades" and as a result, early "colonial governments
obtained most of their lands by purchase" rather than force or
theoretical "discovery., 27 Much of the land acquisition was done
by treaty, with the consent of the Indians. The practice of treating
for Indian land was based on the following assumptions: "(1) that
both parties to treaties were sovereign powers [since treaties are
essentially agreements between nations]; (2) that Indian tribes had
some form of transferrable title to the land; and (3) that acquisition
of Indian lands was solely a governmental matter, not to be left to
individual colonists. 28 Thus, regardless of the theoretical basis
Historian: Reconsidering the Origins of the Discovery Doctrine, 13 J.L. & POL.
759, 761-62 (1997).
23 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595-96 (1823).
24 Id. at 588-94.
25 Id. at 591-92. See also Robertson, supra note 22, at 760.
26 21 U.S. at 587-94.
27 COHEN, supra note 8, at 55-56.
28 COHEN, supra note 8, at 53.
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underlying the discovery doctrine, in reality the Indians "were
treated as sovereigns possessing full ownership rights to the lands
of America. '"29
The early colonists recognized Indian sovereignty, and rebelled
against British attempts to restrict colonial deals for Indian land.
This can be seen in the colonists' reaction to the English Crown's
Proclamation of 1763, which reserved the lands west of the
Appalachian mountains to the Indian tribes, such that any land
transactions in the region required royal approval.3" Many land
speculators, including George Washington and the colonial
governments themselves, considered the Proclamation an infringe-
ment on their rights to purchase and treat for land directly with the
tribes. Legal scholar Robert A. Williams, Jr. writes that many
arguments were put forth against the Proclamation, "[b]ut undoubt-
edly one of [the colonists'] favorite arguments held that Indian
tribes, as free and sovereign nations, possessed the natural law right
to sell the lands they occupied to whomsoever they wished. 31
The colonists were also exposed to, and heavily influenced by,
native political organization. The Iroquois Confederacy, a govern-
ment based upon democratic principles, had a particular influence
on the founding fathers. As a result of diplomatic meetings held
during the time the colonists sought the Iroquois as allies, Benja-
min Franklin was impressed with the Iroquois system of uniting
different tribes into a common, more powerful confederacy, and
advocated the same for the several English colonies. 32 Franklin
was referring not only to the alliance of the separate tribes under
one confederacy, but also to the democratic principles of the
Iroquois. They had "provisions for initiative, referendum and recall,
and suffrage for women as well as men. 33 The Great Council of
29 COHEN, supra note 8, at 55.
30 BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49
(1972).
3' Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Discourses of Sovereignty in Indian Country,
11 INDIAN L. SUPPORT CTR. REP. 1, 2-3 (1988).
32 Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul Mcsloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The
Practical Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 531, 544 n.49 (1994).
" Felix S. Cohen, Americanizing the White Man, in THE INDIAN'S QUEST
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the Confederacy consisted of an upper (older brothers) house and
a lower (younger brothers) house and consensus was mandatory.34
Other eastern tribes had similar democratic governments:
The Deep South was controlled by three confederacies: the
Creeks with their town system, the Natchez, and the
Powhattan confederation which extended into tidelands
Virginia. The Pequots and their cousins the Mohicans
controlled the area of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Long Island.35
Western Indian tribes had similar political systems. For
example, during the period from 1782 to 1800, the Mandan and
Hidatsa of the upper Missouri had a federation of three Hidatsa
villages and nine or more Mandan villages organized for mutual
defense against neighboring enemies.36 The three individual
Hidatsa villages had their own tribal council composed of the most
distinguished war leaders of each village, reportedly consisting of
ten to twelve members. Decisions were usually by unanimous
consent. The Mandan maintained their own governing councils, but
the two independent councils met jointly from time to time to
discuss common problems.37 The Mandan and Hidatsa would soon
be joined by the Arikara, and the Three Tribes remain united to
this day.38
At the outset of the Revolutionary War, both the British and the
colonists sought the assistance of the strong eastern tribes, whose
military support would undoubtedly influence the fighting.
Typically, this assistance was obtained by treaty. For example, the
Iroquois territory was located in the heart of the fighting. Both the
British and the Americans had been soliciting the Iroquois' alliance
FOR JUSTICE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 315, 319, Book 2 of THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1970).
14 BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS 25 (1982).
35 VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 12 (1988) [hereinafter
DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS].
36 ALFRED W. BOWERS, HIDATSA SOCIAL AND CEREMONIAL ORGANIZATION
24 (1992).
31 Id. at 27-29.
38 See Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412, 1414 n.1
(8th Cir. 1996).
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(or continued neutrality as the colonies preferred). 39 Aware of the
problems the colonies would face if the tribes did support England,
the Continental Congress organized an "Indian department in
competition with the British Indian administration and had
formulated plans to attach the Indians to the American cause.,
40
The political responses of the British and the colonies illustrate a
healthy respect for the power possessed by the Indians.
Contrary to popular myth, nearly all of the early Indian treaties
were treaties of peace and friendship whereby the colonists sought
the aid of the tribes against the British. Most of the Indian treaties
were not the result of "conquest" as many textbooks teach. Instead,
they were born of the need of the colonists to have the more
powerful tribes as their allies. This proposition is amply illustrated
when one examines the history of the Delaware Treaty of 1778, as
did Vine Deloria, Jr., in Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties:
The first treaty signed between an American Indian tribe
and the United States took place only three years after the
beginning of the Revolutionary War, at a time when no
.one knew for sure whether the colonists would gain their
freedom or the King of England would soon have a
gigantic hanging party of rebellious subjects. In September
1778, a delegation of Americans visited the chiefs of the
Delaware Nation at Fort Pitt, in western Pennsylvania.
They sought permission from the Delaware Nation to
travel over its lands in order to attack the British posts in
southern Canada.
Plainly, the colonists were on the ropes in the West, and
had the Delawares refused to allow passage, the United
States might have been faced with a violent Indian war in
addition to its scrimmage with the British. To have
pretended decades later that the American Congress had
always asserted its claim to Indian lands under the doctrine
of discovery, or that it had always regulated the internal
affairs of the Indian tribes in its guardianship capacity, is
9 GRAYMONT, supra note 30, at 48.
40 GRAYMONT, supra note 30, at 66.
358
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
sheer self-serving rhetoric when the nature of this first
treaty is understood. If the Delaware treaty exemplified the
way that the United States asserted its plenary power over
the Indian tribes, it was certainly a humble way of doing
SO.
4 1
During the formative years following the revolution, similar
treaties were reached with the Cherokee in the South, and with
other tribes with whom the United States desired peace and sought
as allies. For example, during the War of 1812 with Britain, the
United States sent emissaries to the then western tribes in an
attempt to recruit their alliance against the British. Among the
results was the Treaty of 1814 with the Wyandots, Delawares,
Shawanese, Senecas and Miamies, under which the tribes became
the allies of the United States against Britain.42
Of course, history also teaches that these early treaties were
systematically broken by the United States at its convenience.
Indian allies, once so critical to the wars with Britain, France and
Spain were cast aside and removed once the United States became
powerful enough in its own right and the eastern tribes were no
longer necessary to its existence. The history behind the betrayal
and forced removal of these once powerful allies is beyond the
scope of this Article. 43 The point to be made is that the European
41 DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 7, at 118-
19. See infra pp. 370-71, discussing the "plenary power" doctrine.
42 DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS, supra note 35, at 41.
43 It must be noted, however, that the forced removal of the eastern tribes
in the 1830s is really no different than the current attempts at ethnic cleansing
practiced by the Serbs in Kosovo, a practice abhorred by the Clinton Administra-
tion and rightly so. The United States has its own closet skeletons in this respect,
for it was once guilty of the very same sin it now so publicly decries. See
SAMUEL CARTER III, CHEROKEE SUNSET, A NATION BETRAYED 239-66 (1976).
History teaches that other tribes suffered the same fate as the United States
moved west. This is why it is so critical today that Indian treaty rights and
sovereignty be protected, maintained and rebuilt. Allowing the continued erosion
of these rights by states and the federal government simply makes the United
States appear hypocritical in the eyes of the world in light of its own history. See
infra pp. 403-06. See also DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES,
supra note 7, at 4-12 (discussing the removal of Indian tribes from their
traditional homeland with the expansion of white settlers); DELORIA, CUSTER
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explorers, the colonists, and the United States historically treated
the Indian tribes who occupied the land prior to their arrival as
sovereign nations. These early treaties and the Indian treaties that
followed the settlement of the West embodied the notion that the
tribes possessed original sovereignty and had a prior legal claim to
the land the colonists wanted for themselves. This sovereignty
would be incorporated by the young Supreme Court into United
States law in a series of early cases involving the Cherokee Nation.
B. The Cherokee Experience
The historical relationship between the United States and the
Cherokee Nation during and immediately following the American
Revolution is important because it influenced several early
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The Cherokee cases
ultimately reaffirmed the historical fact that this country's Indian
tribes are sovereign, albeit in a strange, controversial sort of
way.44
In the years following the American Revolution, Indian
relations with the new federal government were tenuous in the
south for at least three reasons. First, the southern Indian nations
of the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw "had organized
governments and astute leaders, who put forth their rights to land
and who could field sizable military forces. 45 Second, the
southern "states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia . . were imbued with a strong sense of their state
sovereignty., 46 Third, the Spanish presence in Florida and the
treaties they signed with the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws,
continued to threaten American interests.47
By 1785, Congress established a commission to treat with the
southern tribes. The Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees
DIED FOR YOUR SINs, supra note 35, at 31-53 (exploring the legacy of broken
treaties in detail).
44 See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing generally the
dichotomy between tribal sovereignty and federal power).
4' FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES 59 (1994).
46 Id.
47 id.
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pledged peace with the tribe, defined the boundaries of the
Cherokee nation, allowed "'the Indians [to] punish [trespassers] or
not as they please'," and committed the United States as protector-
ate.48 Within a few years, however, the United States would break
its word. As early as 1789, President Washington reported to the
Senate that the Hopewell Treaty with the Cherokees "has been
entirely violated by the disorderly white people on the frontiers. ' 49
Instead of protecting the rights of the tribe, however, the federal
government simply negotiated a new treaty with the Cherokee, the
1791 Treaty of Holston, in which the tribe ceded more of its land
to the federal government in return for a reservation of smaller
territory. °
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sought an
injunction to prevent the state of Georgia from enforcing its laws
and trespassing upon the territory reserved to the Cherokee by
treaty.51 The Cherokee argued that their history of treaty making
with the United States and the language of the treaties themselves
were an express recognition of tribal sovereignty. 52 In addition,
the Cherokee asserted the supremacy of federal treaties over state
law under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. Chief Justice John
Marshall agreed:
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the
character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its
own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a
majority of the judges, been completely successful. They
have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement
of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by
the United States recognize them as a people capable of
maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of
their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the
48 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 97 (citing Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785,
U.S.-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 18).
" GETCHES, supra note 5, at 122.
50 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 122.
5' 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
52 Id. at 16.
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citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these
treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the
Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by
those acts.53
Although the Court recognized the Cherokee as a state,
Marshall ruled that the tribe did not constitute a foreign state and
therefore the Court had no original jurisdiction over the case.54
Marshall's opinion was not without controversy among the other
Justices. At the time, the Court was composed of seven Justices.
Justice Duvall was absent and the remaining six Justices were
equally divided 2-2-2 as to the status of Indian tribes. Justices
Marshall and McLean took a middle-of-the-road approach,
characterizing tribes as "domestic dependent nations. 55 Justices
Johnson and Baldwin saw tribes as possessing no sovereignty at
all.56 Justices Thompson and Story concluded that the Cherokee
was a "foreign nation possessing sovereignty in the international
sense."57 Attorney General William Wirt, writing an opinion for
then President Andrew Jackson on the validity of the Cherokee
treaty, agreed with Justices Thompson and Story, finding no reason
to distinguish between the Cherokee treaty and the treaties with
other nations. Wirt concluded that if "the Indians are independent
to the purpose of treating, their independence is, to that purpose, as
absolute as that of any other nation., 58 Thus, although the Court
was divided on the precise constitutional status of Indian tribes,
four of the six justices, joined by the Attorney General, embraced
the notion that Indian tribes were sovereign nations capable of
maintaining their own government.
53 id.
14 Id. at 20.
55 Id. at 17.
56 Id. at 22, 50 (Baldwin, Johnson, J.J., concurring in separate opinions).
" GETCHES, supra note 5, at 137 (referring to Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at
58 (Thompson, J., dissenting)).
58 See DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 7, at
262-63 (quoting from Attorney General Wirt's opinion and arguing persuasively
that this is the more legally defensible view).
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The opinions in Cherokee Nation were dicta because the Court
ultimately found that it lacked jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Cherokee
Nation is important, not only because it is part of the foundation
upon which principles of federal Indian law are based, but because
it illustrates that, from the beginning of this nation's existence,
Indian tribes were considered sovereign, and that their sovereignty
was embodied in the treaties and relations with the United States.
One year later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify
its discussion in Cherokee Nation. In Worcester v. Georgia,59 the
state of Georgia had arrested and convicted non-Indians of
violating the Georgia law requiring travelers to the Cherokee
territory to obtain a license from the governor.60 This time the
Court was clear: Georgia had no jurisdiction in Cherokee Territory.
By virtue of the treaties signed with the Cherokees and under the
Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the Court ruled that
Congress had the exclusive right to manage all affairs with the
tribe.6' Politically, the Cherokee territory was separate from the
state of Georgia, though geographically within its bounds. Absent
the consent of Congress, Georgia had no jurisdiction over the non-
Indian missionaries because the Cherokee Nation's authority within
its territory was exclusive.62
In Worcester, Marshall reviewed the historical and legal
development of the federal-tribal relationship. He found that the
tribes had signed treaties and been treated as sovereigns by the
European nations, and the United States had continued this
relationship of alliances through treaties, "which itself evidenced an
acknowledgment of the tribes' sovereign status": 63
The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil, from time immemorial .... The very term 'nation,' so
generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from
others.' The [C]onstitution, by declaring treaties already
'9 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
60 Id. at 542.
61 Id. at 573.
62 Id. at 556-57; COHEN, supra note 8, at 261.
63 COHEN, supra note 8, at 234.
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made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law
of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits
their rank among those powers who are capable of making
treaties. The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our
own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as
we have applied them to the other nations of the earth.
They are applied to all in the same sense.
Georgia, herself, has furnished conclusive evidence that
her former opinions on this subject concurred with those
entertained by her sister states, and by the government of
the United States. Various acts of her legislature have been
cited in the argument, including the contract of cession
made in the year 1802, all tending to prove her acquies-
cence in the universal conviction that the Indian nations
possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that
right should be extinguished by the United States, with
their consent: that their territory was separated from that of
any state within whose chartered limits they might reside,
by a boundary line, established by treaties: that, within
their boundary, they possessed rights with which no state
could interfere: and that the whole power of regulating the
intercourse with them, was vested in the United States. 4
Marshall then rejected Georgia's argument that the Cherokee
Nation had somehow given up its sovereignty by agreeing to a
treaty in which the Cherokee agreed to peace and accepted the care
and protection of the United States. Other articles of the treaty
recognized the Cherokee's right to self government, and the mere
fact that the Cherokee accepted the care and protection of the
United States did not mean they had given up their right to self-
government.65 More importantly, such a proposition was inconsis-
tent with the law of nations:
6' Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-60.
65 Id. at 560-61.
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[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its
right to self government, by associating with a stronger,
and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one
more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this
kind are not wanting in Europe. 'Tributary and feudatory
states,' says Vattel, do not thereby cease to be sovereign
and independent states, so long as self government and
sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state. At the present day, more than
one state may be considered as holding its right of self
government under the guarantee and protection of one or
more allies.
The Cherokee [N]ation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of [C]ongress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our [C]onstitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.66
Worcester established that Georgia had no authority to regulate
activities within the territory reserved to the tribe by treaty, unless
Congress, pursuant to the exercise of its own authority under the
Commerce Clause, expressly authorized state jurisdiction.67
Together, the cases of Cherokee Nation and Worcester stand for the
proposition that there exists, within our constitutional framework,
a unique government-to-government relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes. The relationship is one of
trust-grounded in treaties, tribal sovereignty and the Indian
Commerce Clause-under which the tribes within their territory
govern free of state interference, subject only to the power of
6 Id.
67 Id.
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Congress to limit their authority. The Cherokee cases are the legal
foundation upon which tribal sovereignty is based, a foundation
which is supported by history.68
C. Treaty Making and the Westward Expansion
The process of treaty making with Indian tribes continued as
the United States expanded westward. Again, very few if any of the
early Indian treaties were made because the United States con-
quered the Indians or felt a moral obligation to protect them.
Instead, the treaties were often born of necessity. The United
States, far from being the superpower it is today, had to acknow-
ledge the right of the many still powerful Indian tribes to occupy
their territory as sovereigns. In many cases this was to avoid
additional warfare, and in others it was to acknowledge the peace
and friendship that had always existed between the United States
and a particular tribe. The Comanche treaty of 1835, for example,
was executed because the Comanches, Wichitas and their allies
controlled a vast territory into which no one strayed without
permission. The treaty of 1835 allowed the United States and her
citizens safe passage across Comanche territory, and at the same
time recognized that the Comanche and their allies were sovereign
powers and must be dealt with as such.6 9
After the Civil War, Americans increased their westward
expansion under the so-called doctrine of "Manifest Destiny,"
attracted by the promise of gold, cheap land, and an abundance of
natural resources waiting to be exploited.7 ° The western Indian
68 While Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester recognized that tribes
existed as separate sovereigns, he also wrote that tribal sovereignty was subject
to the overriding power of Congress, creating what some consider a dichotomy
between tribal sovereignty and federal power/trust responsibility that many find
hard to reconcile. Yet the law of nations cited by Marshall to support the
continued sovereignty of a smaller state makes it easier to see that the power of
Congress versus tribal self-government concepts are really not inconsistent. See
id. at 561; see also infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
69 DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 7, at 132-
33.
70 The doctrine of Manifest Destiny essentially embodied the Christian
notion that it was the American Destiny to "overspread the continent allotted by
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tribes soon found themselves having to deal with non-Indian
settlers seeking their fortunes in the west. Numerous treaties were
signed with the western tribes during this period. The early
treaties-those signed at Fort Laramie in 1851 and at Fort Atkinson
in 1853, for example--did not include any land cessions by the
Indians. As with earlier treaties they were agreements of peace and
"the right of the United States to establish roads and military posts
in [the Indians'] territories. 71
While some Indians agreed to peace, others' resistance to white
settlement in their territories was passionate. Refusing to be
confined to reservations, many tribes, including the Sioux,
Cheyenne and Blackfeet in the northern plains and the Comanche,
Kiowa, and Apache further south, sustained wars with the United
States Cavalry. After defeating Lieutenant William Fetterman and
his troops along the Bozeman Trail, Red Cloud and his Oglala
Sioux warriors succeeded in having the section of the trail which
ran through their territory closed via the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie. 72 The "virtual military standoff' between the federal
government and the Sioux resulted in their reserving lands in their
"traditional ... homeland in the Dakota Territory."73 Today, the
Lakota continue to occupy their reservations under this treaty, and
continue to claim that the lands reserved in this treaty, including
the Black Hills, were illegally taken from them.74 Similar treaties
Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions."
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 230 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1976)
(noting the first use of the phrase "Manifest Destiny" by John L. Robinson,
writing in The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, July-Aug. 1845).
The founders and settlers believed they had the divine support of God. The more
skeptical view is that Manifest Destiny was simply an attempt to place God's
stamp of approval on the taking of Indian land and the exploitation of the West's
natural resources.
71 PRUCHA, supra note 45, at 239.
72 Id. at 282.
73 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 17 (1995).
14 See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HELLS WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIoux
NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT ch. 17 (1991)
(discussing the Sioux tribe's historical and ongoing claims to the Black Hills
territory).
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were executed in 1868 with the Crow, the Navajo and other
Northwest and Plains tribes. Virtually all of these treaties contained
clauses under which the tribes ceded vast portions of their territory,
in return for the right to the exclusive and undisturbed use and
occupation of the lands they reserved.
The Indian treaties were written in the English language, in
letters unfamiliar to the tribes. In many instances, they were
negotiated with "friendly" Indians whom the federal negotiators
selected as "chiefs" purporting to bind Indian tribes and bands not
even present at the negotiations. The individuals signing the treaties
were usually unaware that their signatures would bind these other
tribes. "There [were] numerous accounts of threats, coercion,
bribery, and outright fraud by the negotiators for the United
States."75 Moreover, by the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the Indians' bargaining power of the early to mid 1800s had been
considerably weakened by a number of factors. The ever-increasing
number of non-Indians hungry for more land, the destruction of the
buffalo and other game upon which many tribes depended for food,
foreign diseases which decimated tribal populations, and the
growing military strength of the United States all contributed to the
loss of Indian strength and bargaining power. As a result, the tribes
west of the Mississippi were eventually faced with the reality of
ceding large portions of their territory to the United States in return
for reserving smaller territory for themselves.
Nevertheless, these treaties were still binding agreements which
contained the promises of the United States that the Indians could
continue to use and occupy the lands they reserved. In return for
these promises, the Indians agreed to peace, and to cede to the
United States vast amounts of territory that had rightfully been
theirs. The promises made by the United States could not be
ignored or minimized simply because the tribes' position had been
weakened. Chief Justice Marshall was very aware of this proposi-
tion in the context of the eastern tribes who had been forced to
cede their lands by treaty:
" Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601, 610 (1975).
368
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
When the United States gave peace, did they not also
receive it? Were not both parties desirous of it? If we
consult the history of the day, does it not inform us that
the United States were not at least as anxious to receive it
as the [Indians] ?76
The history underlying the making of the Indian treaties has led
to the creation of legal canons of construction that courts must
employ in interpreting Indian treaties---canons which are designed
to rectify the inequality of the bargaining process:
Three primary rules have been developed: ambiguous
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties
concerned; Indian treaties must be interpreted as the
Indians themselves would have understood them; and
Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians.77
From these canons of construction, the Supreme Court has
developed the so-called reserved rights doctrine. In 1905, elaborat-
ing on the purposes of the 1859 Yakima treaty, the Court stated
that a treaty is "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
right from them,-a reservation of those not granted. 7 8 The
reservations were not "particular parcels of land... [but] were in
large areas of territory... [and] [t]hey reserved rights ... to every
individual Indian, as though named therein., 79 One of the most
important rights reserved by the Tribes was their territorial
sovereignty.8"
Although the Indians had the legitimate expectation that the
United States would keep the promises it made, the treaties were
regularly broken in a number of ways. The question became
whether the United States could break its promises without legal
liability. In 1903, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court ruled that
Congress had the authority to nullify Indian treaties without the
76 Id. at 612 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551 (1832)).
7 Id. at 617 (citations omitted).
" United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
79 Id.
80 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-22 (1959); Babbitt Ford, Inc. v.
Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 926 (1984).
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consent of the tribe.8" According to Justice White, who delivered
the opinion, Congress had the authority to act "in a possible
emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and
disposal of the tribal lands ... [and] the assent of the Indians could
not be obtained."82 In a questionable interpretation of history, the
Court stated that when "treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress."83 To justify its holding,
the Court essentially invented the notion of Congress' "plenary
authority" over Indian tribes under the Indian Commerce Clause,
an authority which was not subject to judicial review.84 The Court
had no explicit Constitutional basis for attributing such broad
power to Congress. It "simply converted its perception of congres-
sional practice into a valid constitutional doctrine without any
legal support or analysis."85
Even so, decisions subsequent to Lone Wolf have clarified that
the so-called plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes,
especially in matters of sovereignty, is not meant to be "absolute"
or "total. 86 Instead, with this power comes the duty to exercise
it fairly and with due regard for the historic right of the tribes to
occupy their territory free of state interference. One respected
commentator has observed that Congress' plenary power can be
successfully integrated into constitutional principles "if it is
understood that plenary power may properly be used to advance
tribal self-government and protect tribes from state encroachment
81 187 U.S. 553, 556-68 (1903).
82 Id. at 564.
83 Id. at 566 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the canons of construction
which require that treaties be interpreted in favor of the Indians have led to the
rule that courts will not find that treaties have been abrogated or modified unless
Congress has made its intent to do so unmistakably clear. See, e.g., United States
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S.
404, 412-13 (1968).
84 Pommersheim, supra note 10, at 319-20.
85 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 73, at 47.
86 COHEN, supra note 8, at 219. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 734
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40,
54 (1946).
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in Indian country, but it cannot be used to invade the legitimate
spheres of tribal self-government and the integrity of tribal
existence. 87 Such an interpretation is certainly consistent with the
Cherokee cases,88 and the concept embodied in the law of nations,
that a smaller nation does not lose its sovereignty by coming under
the care and protection of a larger and stronger nation. 89 More-
over, because of the relationship of trust that exists between the
United States and the tribes, and because the rights reserved by
tribes in their treaties are considered property rights, the Supreme
Court has recognized that Congress must clearly express its intent
in legislation to abrogate the tribes' treaty rights, including the
territorial sovereignty reserved therein. 9°
D. The End of Treaty Making, 1870-1970: One Hundred
Years of Inconsistent Indian Policy
By the late 1860s, federal officials realized that the reservation
system "and the treaty system that had created it" were not
working.91 A number of factors contributed to the movement to
end treaty making. First, white settlers "needed" more land in the
West. Second, the bureaucrats believed that the Indians could not
be "civilized" sufficiently to become white if they were allowed to
continue to exist as separate politically autonomous people.92
Ultimately though, it was a power struggle between the houses of
Congress that ended treaty making with the tribes in 187 1.93 The
House of Representatives resented the Senate's exclusive constitu-
tional power to ratify treaties. The Appropriations Act of March 3,
87 Pommersheim, supra note 10, at 323.
88 See supra Part I.B, discussing the Cherokee cases.
89 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discussing Worcester).
90 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986). As discussed more
fully below, Congress has never enacted express legislation terminating tribal
sovereignty and/or treaty rights, although it has in some cases enacted statutes
limiting the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Instead, in apparent conflict with the
doctrine of plenary congressional power, the Supreme Court has recently been
most active in abrogating tribal sovereignty.
91 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 175-78.
92 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 175-76.
93 COHEN, supra note 8, at 127; GETCHES, supra note 5, at 178-79.
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1871, put an end to treaty making between the federal government
and the tribes, but upheld the obligation of existing treaties.94
Although the formal policy of treaty making ended in 1871, the
federal government nevertheless continued to make intergovern-
mental agreements with tribes, pass statutes, and deliver executive
orders establishing Indian reservations. These "treaty substitutes,"
especially those which established reservations for tribes whose
territory had not been defined by treaty, carry the same weight and
legal effect as a treaty.95 The Supreme Court confirmed the
equality of each type of document in Antoine v. Washington96 and
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.97 Thus, to the extent the tribes
today retain the territory reserved in treaties or by executive order
or congressional act, the tribal sovereignty reserved therein retains
its vitality.
Following the formal end of the treaty making period, the
federal government undertook approximately one hundred years of
inconsistent and at times destructive policy making, in an attempt
to define how Indian tribes should continue to exist within the
United States. Because of this lack of consistent policy making,
tribes have had to struggle to survive socially, politically and
economically. Indian people still struggle to overcome the effects
of these policies today.
1. Allotment and Assimilation
Prior to 1887, title to most Indian land was communally owned
by the tribe, since tribes never had a concept of owning individual
parcels of land.98 From about 1887 until approximately 1928, the
federal government attempted to terminate tribal cultural, social and
political existence by breaking up reservation lands into individual
9 COHEN, supra note 8, at 127 (citing ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994))).
95 WILKINSON, supra note 13, at 101-02.
96 420 U.S. 194, 200-04 (1975).
17 455 U.S. 130, 133 n.1 (1982).
9' There were exceptions, of course. Some treaties had provisions which
allowed individual Indians to select parcels of land for farming. See, e.g., Treaty
with the Crows, May 7, 1868, art. 6, 15 Stat. 649, available in 1868 WL 5270.
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allotments. The professed goal was to make Indian people farmers,
and assimilate them into the dominant agrarian society of the
American West.99 While this may have seemed to Congress at the
time to be a noble goal, a darker side of the allotment era existed
as well. Most allotments ranged from 80 to 160 acres per individu-
al.' 00 After each tribal member received an allotment, huge tracts
of surplus tribal land remained-land previously reserved to the
tribes by treaty. The surplus lands were opened to settlement by
non-Indian homesteaders. Ultimately, the opening of tribal land for
the taking by non-Indians resulted in another federal taking of
Indian land to the tune of some 90 million acres.' ° ' In many
cases affected tribes lost over fifty percent of their reserved lands
to non-Indians.' °2
As a result of allotment, the affected Indian reservations were
no longer the sanctuaries they had been when the Indian treaties
were made. They were no longer places where the Indians could
maintain a separate political and cultural existence free of non-
Indian influence. The reservations became "campuses for training
Indians in the 'arts of civilization.' The Bureau of Indian Affairs
["BIA"] took unprecedented control of everyday Indian life,
seeking to squeeze out Indian government, religion and cul-
ture."'0 3 The BIA and missionaries undertook a sustained effort
to "civilize" the Indian, to remake him into a white Christian God-
fearing American farmer. In the eyes of the Christian reformers,
allotment and assimilation would put an end to the "injurious
habits" the Indians possessed, such as their "frequent feasts,
community in food, heathen ceremonies, and dances, constant
99 COHEN, supra note 8, at 128-29.
100 Under the original General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, each head
of a household was allotted 160 acres and minors were each allotted 40 acres.
COHEN, supra note 8, at 133. Congress amended the Dawes Act in 1891 to
provide to each Indian allotments of either 80 acres of agricultural land or 160
acres of grazing land. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 133.
101 GETCHEs, supra note 5, at 179.
102 COHEN, supra note 8, at 138.
103 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 168.
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visiting." 1" The ultimate goal was to extinguish tribal sovereign-
ty once all the Indians had been sufficiently civilized.
The allotment policy failed miserably and tribal sovereignty
survived. In spite of the legislative and judicial attempts to destroy
tribalism during this period, tribal culture and traditions remained
alive and strong. Reservations were still "Indian Country," and
tribes still fought for and maintained a "measured separatism" apart
from the dominant society.1°5 Tribalism survived in places like
the Southwest because of its geographic isolation. It survived in
more populous regions by "going underground, out of sight of the
BIA Indian agents and missionaries." 10 6 Nationwide, "large
numbers of Indians persisted in holding on to their identities as
tribal peoples by maintaining their kinship relations, ways of
thinking about and acting in the world, systems of meaning, and
tribal languages."107
2. The Indian Reorganization Act
In the late 1920s, with the recognized failure of allot-
ment/assimilation, non-Indian reformers initiated another change in
federal Indian policy designed to "revive tribal governing structures
through the Indian Reorganization Act ["IRA"] of 1934. ' ' s John
Collier, President Roosevelt's Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Felix S. Cohen, Chairman of the Interior Department's Board of
Appeals, and others had been influenced by the 1928 Meriam
Report. The Report "examined the administration of Indian policy
and its impact on Indian life,"1 °9 and found "poverty, disease,
suffering, and discontent ... pervad[ing] the life of the
104 History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 428-89 (1934) (report by Delos Sacket
Otis), reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 5, at 192.
105 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 215.
106 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 215.
107 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 215.
108 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 216 (referring to ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(codified and amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
109 COHEN, supra note 8, at 144.
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overwhelming majority of Indians."" It also found federal
Indian policy to be "inefficient" and "paternalistic.....
Collier recommended reforms to reverse this trend, which were
incorporated into the IRA. The Act
enabled tribes to organize for their common welfare and to
adopt federally approved constitutions and bylaws. It
permitted the employment of legal counsel of the tribe's
own choice and authorized the tribal councils established
under the act to negotiate with federal, state and local
governments.... Formal tribal government was expected
to become the rule rather than the exception. 1
2
This so-called Indian reorganization era reflected a policy shift
away from assimilation/termination goals and back toward the
policy of recognizing Indian tribes as government units with
inherent sovereign authority over their territory.
113
Underlying the IRA was the recognition that the forced
assimilation policies of the allotment era worked to destroy Indians
and their communities. The new generation of reformers "believed
that the tribe itself, organized as a self-governing community, was
better equipped to deal with the outside influences of the dominant
society.... A major objective of the IRA was elimination of the
czar-like power that the BIA exercised over practically every aspect
of Indian life." 5 Tribal government was given renewed vigor by
provisions of the IRA that authorized Indian tribes to reorganize
their governments by adopting constitutions and by-laws under
which the sovereign power of the tribes was expressly recog-
nized." 6
The problem was that the constitution and by-laws under which
the tribes were expected to organize were generic documents
110 COHEN, supra note 8, at 144.
111 COHEN, supra note 8, at 144.
112 VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 14 (1983), reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 5, at 223.
113 DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS, supra note 35, at 54.
114 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 216.
115 Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 955, 966-67 (1972).
116 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
prepared by bureaucrats in the Interior Department. These docu-
ments typically vested governmental authority in an elected tribal
council, in many cases vesting legislative, executive and judicial
power in the one body.1 17 As a result, many tribes have found it
difficult to integrate their IRA constitutions with their traditional
way of operating tribal government.1 8 Despite these problems,
many tribes reorganized their governments under the Act, and
many began the long slow process of regaining the governmen-
tal/political structure that the federal government had previously
attempted to extinguish. More importantly, the IRA signaled an end
to the policies underlying the allotment and alienation of tribal
land. Once again, tribal self-government was encouraged.
3. Termination
The renewal of tribal self-determination would be short lived.
By the late 1940s, Collier and Cohen had resigned their positions
with the federal government and Congress was calling for a repeal
of the IRA. Though the IRA was never repealed, in 1949, the
Hoover Commission "recommend[ed] an about-face in federal
policy: 'complete integration' of Indians should be the goal." 1 9
In 1953, Congress passed Resolution 108, with little or no
discussion or opposition and certainly no input from the tribes who
were to be affected thereby. Resolution 108 provided that all tribes
in California, Florida, New York, Texas, and certain named other
tribes, "should be freed from Federal supervision and control and
from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to
17 In part as a result of the IRA many tribes today have no separation of
powers. Many non-Indians like to cite this fact to support their challenge to tribal
jurisdiction, arguing that they will not get a fair deal in tribal courts because
tribal courts are controlled by the tribal council. Most fail to realize that the IRA
constitutions, under which a majority of tribes operate, were perpetuated and
approved by the Department of the Interior itself. See COHEN, supra note 8, at
149-51.
.18 DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 112, at 15, reprinted in GETCHES, supra
note 5, at 224.
19 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 229.
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Indians.' 120 Resolution 108 then directed the Secretary of the
Interior to investigate and report to Congress by January 1, 1954
recommendations for legislation that would accomplish the
purposes of the resolution. 21 Thirteen subsequent hearings were
held. Tribal members who would be affected by the proposed
legislation were able to testify at nine of the hearings. The majority
of tribal members opposed the legislation, in part because it would
result in the loss of rights they had reserved in treaties. 2 2 Al-
though no comprehensive legislation was passed, individual acts
were passed which resulted in the loss of federal recognition of
approximately 109 tribes, most of whom were vulnerable, unsus-
pecting and without the resources to counter the politics of
termination.1 23 The termination of federal recognition of these
tribes meant the end of the special relationship between the
affected tribes and the federal government. It meant the end of
federal assistance, which many tribes had obtained by treaty in
return for the cession of most of their land to the United States. Its
effects were devastating to the tribes and individual Indians. The
affected tribes became subject to state law, ending the trust status
of tribal land, so that their land, once promised to them forever,
became taxable and freely transferable. 24 Many were no longer
able to provide health care. Infant death rates rose, and the number
of people on welfare increased. 25 As a result, the effect of
termination in most cases wound up costing the federal government
more money, when the object of termination was to save mon-
ey.12
6
Although devastating to the tribes that were actually terminated,
the policies of termination affected all Indian tribes in a number of
120 Gary Orfield, A Study of the Termination Policy (1966), reprinted in
GETCHES, supra note 5, at 231.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 232-33.
123 DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS, supra note 35, at 64-65;
Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy,
5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139, 151 (1977).
124 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 248.
125 DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS, supra note 35, at 60-77.
126 Id. at 71.
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ways. 127 Many programs pushing towards rapid assimilation
dramatically impacted tribes who were not singled out for termina-
tion. For example, Public Law 280, which provided a mechanism
for the extension of state jurisdiction in Indian Country, was passed
during this period. 128 Many educational programs and services
were transferred from the federal government to the states. Indian
health responsibility was transferred from the BIA to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. The federal government
implemented relocation programs to encourage Indian migration
from their reservations to the cities, with the hope that Indian
people would simply disappear. 129 In fact, many eventually
returned to their homeland. Of those that stayed in the cities, many
lived in cultural isolation and poverty, their identity taken.
130
Nevertheless, none of the language of the termination legisla-
tion "expressly extinguished" the inherent tribal sovereignty of the
tribes whose federal recognition was terminated.13 1 The federal
courts continued to support inherent tribal status even without
federal recognition. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, the Court of Claims decided that the "Termination Act did
not abolish the [Menominee] tribe or its membership."'132 On
appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that only the federal trust
relationship with the tribes was terminated and that treaties were
not affected. 133 Similarly, in Kimball v. Callahan, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that despite termination "[t]he Klamaths still maintain
a tribal constitution and tribal government," and the termination act
"did not abrogate tribal treaty rights of hunting, fishing and
trapping. Neither did the Act affect the sovereign authority of the
Tribe to regulate the exercise of those rights."'
134
The government's attempts to ostensibly "free" Indian people
from the bondage of federal supervision via termination policies
127 COHEN, supra note 8, at 152-53.
121 See infra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing Public Law 280).
129 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 233-34.
130 COHEN, supra note 8, at 169-70.
131 GETcHES, supra note 5, at 237.
132 388 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967), affd, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
133 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).
'm 590 F.2d 768, 776 (9th Cir. 1979).
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did not go unopposed. Indians organized against the legislative
termination of tribalism, most visibly in the June 1961 American
Indian Chicago Conference. 35  Moreover, state governments
realized the difficulty of assuming many of the responsibilities of
the federal government in Indian country. By 1958, termination
without tribal consent, as it had been practiced, was viewed
unfavorably. Under the Kennedy administration, the termination
policy was "abandon[ed] in practice."'' 36 Even so, many elder
tribal leaders today still remember the days of termination, and the
policy has left an indelible mark on the psyche of Indian people.
E. The Modern Era, Back To Where We Started: The
Federal Policy Supporting Tribal Self-Government
Following the termination era, President Johnson's Great
Society programs "embraced Indian Tribes and invested millions
of dollars in reservation social programs and infrastructure."'' 37 In
1970, President Nixon addressed Congress regarding his progres-
sive vision for Indian policy. President Nixon argued against
"forced termination" and in favor of a "new national policy toward
the Indian people: [one that will] strengthen the Indian's sense of
autonomy without threatening his sense of community.""' Presi-
dent Nixon proposed specific actions to achieve this goal, including
a repeal of the termination policy, placing administrative responsi-
bility of federally funded programs with the tribes themselves and,
with the tribes' consent, tribal control over Indian schools. 139
Riding on the coattails of the activism of Indian leaders during the
preceding decades, 140 Nixon's "Message to Congress" initiated a
new era of reform in Indian policy.' 4' While termination had
135 PRUCHA, supra note 45, at 410.
136 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 252.
... GETCHES, supra note 5, at 252.
138 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 253.
139 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 253-54.
140 DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 7, at 2.
141 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 256.
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"sought to destroy tribal sovereignty ... federal policy in the
1960s and 1970s celebrated tribal self-determination."' 14
2
With relatively few transgressions since 1970, the federal policy
outlined in President Nixon's message to Congress continues today.
In the years following Nixon's policy statement, "an unprecedented
volume of Indian legislation" was passed by Congress, "most of it
favorable to Indian interests."'4' Today both Congress and the
Executive Branch are firmly committed to promoting and protect-
ing tribal sovereignty and self-government.'" The President's
recent Executive Order of May 14, 1998 declares the Clinton
Administration's commitment to tribal sovereignty, a commitment
based upon the historic government-to-government relationship that
has existed between the United States and Indian tribes:
The United States has a unique legal relationship with
Indian tribal governments as set forth in the Constitution
of the United States, treaties, statutes, Executive orders,
and court decisions. Since the formation of the Union, the
United States has recognized Indian tribes as domestic
dependent nations under its protection. In treaties, our
Nation has guaranteed the right of Indian tribes to self-
government. As domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes
exercise inherent sovereign powers over their members and
territory. The United States continues to work with Indian
tribes on a government-to-government basis to address
issues concerning Indian tribal self-government, trust
resources, and Indian tribal treaty and other rights.'45
There are many examples of congressional legislation promot-
ing tribal self-government since 1970. Perhaps the most significant
piece of legislation to emerge during this period was the Indian
142 Williams, supra note 31, at 4.
143 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 256.
144 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 nn.5-6 (1987)
(noting the numerous federal statutes designed to promote tribal government);
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.17 (1983)
(same).
145 Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998) (emphasis added).
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Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.146 It
declared Congress' commitment,
to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique
and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to,
individual Indian tribes and the Indian people as a whole
through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-
determination policy which will permit an orderly transi-
tion from Federal domination of programs for, and services
to, Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the
Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration
of those programs and services. 4 7
The Act allowed the tribes to contract with the BIA and Indian
Health Service ("IHS") for direct tribal delivery of services and
administration of federal funds. Subsequent amendments to the Act
allowed tribes to contract directly for any federal program adminis-
tered for Indians by federal agencies in addition to the BIA or IHS.
For the first time, Congress gave the Indians the means to decide
for themselves how federally funded programs for their benefit
would be administered. Many tribes have taken advantage of the
Act to contract with the federal government to directly provide
services in areas such as police protection, health care, credit, and
natural resource management.
In 1978, the Indian Child Welfare Act 148 outlined the adjudi-
cation process for "child custody cases involving Indian children
that deferr[ed] heavily to tribal governments."'' 49 The "underlying
premise of the Act is that Indian tribes, as sovereign governments,
have a vital interest in any decision as to whether Indian children
should be separated from their families.' 150 To that end, cases
involving the custody of Indian children are directed to tribal
courts. In addition, state courts are required to transfer such cases
to a tribal forum if the parents or the tribe so requests, "absent
146 Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 450a (1994)).
147 Id. § 450a(b); COHEN, supra note 8, at 201.
148 Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994)).
149 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 257.
150 GETCHES, supra note 5, at 607.
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good cause to the contrary."'' The significance of the Indian
Child Welfare Act is found not only in its protections for Indian
children from cultural alienation, but in its recognition of tribal
courts as appropriate forums to adjudicate actions involving Indian
children.
There are other examples of congressional legislation promoting
tribal sovereignty in the 1980s and 1990s. In the late 1980s, for
example, Congress recognized the power of Indian tribes to
"establish and regulate gambling businesses on [the] reservations,"
reaffirming the notion that "a principal goal of Federal Indian
policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-
sufficiency, and .strong tribal government."' 52 Tribal sovereignty
has also been recognized in the area of national environmental
legislation. Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act
and Safe Drinking Water Act, made during the 1980s and 1990s,
authorize the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to treat
Indian tribes as states for purposes of adopting and enforcing air
and water quality standards and assuming primary enforcement
responsibility.'53 Many tribes have asserted regulatory primacy
under these Acts.
Perhaps the strongest recent statement made by Congress in
support of tribal sovereignty comes in the Indian Tribal Justice Act
of 1993. 54 The Act authorized funding to establish or expand a
... GETCHES, supra note 5, at 608.
152 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 2, 102 Stat. 2467
(1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994)). However, the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act also limits tribal sovereignty by placing federal restrictions on
gaming. See infra text accompanying notes 161-163 (discussing legal limitations
on tribal sovereignty).
153 Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, 102 Stat. 2940 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994)); Act of June 19, 1986, Pub. L. 99-339, 100 Stat. 666
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e) (1994)); Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2464 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (1994)); City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 410 (1997).
154 Pub. L. No. 103-76, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601-3631
(1994)).
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"tribal judicial system pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination
Act."' 155 In the Act, Congress expressly found:
[T]he United States has a trust responsibility to each tribal
government that includes the protection of the sovereignty
of each tribal government;
... Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the
exercise of administrative authorities, has recognized the
self-determination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty
of Indian Tribes;
... Indian Tribes possess the inherent authority to
establish their own form of government, including tribal
justice systems;
... tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring
public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments;
... Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly
recognized tribal justice systems as the appropriate forums
for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and
property rights.156
While the current federal Indian policy to protect and promote
Indian sovereignty is firmly entrenched, defining the scope and
limits of sovereignty remains a difficult task. The difficulty is
attributable in part to the federal judiciary's failure to adhere
consistently to the foundational principles set forth by Chief Justice
Marshall in the Cherokee cases, and to the federal government's
own historical failure to adhere to a consistent Indian policy
supporting tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. The pendulum-like
swing of federal Indian policy, from sovereignty to assimilation, to
termination and back again, has severely impeded the ability of
tribes to function as self-sufficient sovereigns. The failure of
Congress, the executive branch and the courts throughout American
history to define and adhere to any consistent Indian policy has
been a significant deterrent to the growth and maturation of tribal
155 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 73, at 130.
156 25 U.S.C. § 3601(2)-(6).
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governments, and has created cultural, social and political instabili-
ty that tribes struggle to overcome everyday:
Perhaps the greatest danger of this historic lack of agree-
ment on the status of tribal self-governing rights in United
States public discourses is its destabilizing impact on tribal
governments. While thematic emphasis may change from
one presidential administration to another at the national
level, there is a broad society-wide consensus on the extent
and limits of federal and state sovereign powers. Most of
us, in fact, if we had to, could articulate a rather certain
vision of the appropriate home rule powers of our own
municipal governments. No such common ground exists,
however, when it comes to defining what sovereign powers
Tribes ought to have in United States society. Until that
common ground is achieved; until it can be said that
federal and state policy makers, non-Indian judges and
courts, and Indians themselves, agree on the basic
parameters of tribal sovereign authority, then tribal govern-
ments will have no stability in United States society. ...
There is an even greater danger posed by this historic
failure to agree on what tribal sovereignty is. Indian voices
have rarely been heard in this nation's discursive battle on
the meaning of sovereignty. They have been drowned out
amidst the din of non-Indians who believe their vision of
tribal sovereignty is the correct vision. In times past ...
the unwillingness of non-Indian America to consider the
views of Indians on the destiny of Indian America has
resulted in disaster and the compounding of Indian power-
lessness. In our present situation, a time in which tribes
have struggled to redefine their role in United States
society by exercising expanded governmental powers, a
failure to be heard may well ensure the final extermination
of tribalism in the United States. The lack of consensus on
the meaning of tribal sovereignty has permitted the
eruption of a violent, racist-inspired backlash against
Indian peoples' vision of what tribal sovereignty ought to
be in the United States. There are many who are deter-
mined to snuff that vision out. This, of course, is the
greatest danger confronting Indian people, that their voices
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will not be heard in the cacophony of national debate on
what is to be done with the Indian.'57
It is possible to define the parameters of tribal sovereignty in
a way which will allow tribes to transcend the instability created
by the assimilation and termination policy failures of the past. But
it is very difficult to define those parameters in a way that will
satisfy everyone. This is primarily due to the fact that Indian tribes
deal regularly with non-Indians either living in, conducting business
in or passing through tribal territory. The dispute over the scope
and limits of tribal sovereignty generally arises in cases where
tribes assert jurisdiction over these non-Indians. In order to define
the parameters of tribal sovereignty, one must explore its legal
limitations. Not surprisingly, these limitations are as confusing and
inconsistent as the federal policies that created them.
II. THE LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY;
RECONCILING THE FAILED POLICIES OF THE PAST
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote the Worcester decision, he
defined tribal sovereignty with an easy and straightforward
approach. The Court held simply that the Cherokee Nation was a
separate political entity, with a territory whose borders were
defined by treaty and within which state authority could not apply
absent the express consent of Congress. 58 Tribal sovereignty
then, was reserved by the Cherokee in its treaties with the United
States, and could not be usurped by anyone without authorization
by Congress, pursuant to its delegated authority to regulate Indian
commerce under the Commerce Clause. Due in part to a legacy of
broken treaties, ill-conceived congressional acts, and judicial
decisions placing implied limitations on the exercise of tribal
sovereignty, numerous exceptions have arisen to the fundamental
rule upon which Chief Justice Marshall based his decision in
Worcester.
The concept of tribal sovereignty can be easily explained in
legal terms. Indian tribes are "unique aggregations possessing
157 Williams, supra note 31, at 4-5.
158 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
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attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory." '159 Tribal sovereignty is inherent, it is not delegated to
tribes by Congress. The inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes exists
by virtue of the federal government's historical recognition of
Indian tribes as independent political entities, whose existence
predates this nation's existence. 16' Although today tribes still
possess sovereign authority over both their members and their
territory, their sovereignty is no longer considered absolute. Rather,
it is described as having "a unique and limited character."1 6 1 It
is unique in that it is limited by the government-to-government
relationship between the tribes and the United States, one premised
upon the history of treaty making and broad congressional authority
to regulate Indian affairs. It is limited by the Supreme Court's
announcement that Indian tribes, in submitting to the power and
protection of the United States government, necessarily gave up
some attributes of their sovereignty. 62 The exercise of tribal
sovereignty is essentially limited by the overriding interests of the
United States government. These interests, of course, have been
defined historically by the different federal Indian policies
previously discussed. As a general rule, Indian tribes today still
possess those aspects of their inherent sovereignty which are not
expressly withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by "implication" as a
necessary result of their so-called dependent status. 163
The express limitations upon tribal sovereignty imposed by
treaty or congressional legislation are the most apparent. The
clearest examples are the numerous treaties under which the tribes
ceded vast portions of their territory to the United States in
exchange for certain concessions and reservations of smaller
159 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (citing United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)).
'60 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896).
161 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
162 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-11 (1978); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
163 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
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territory. With respect to the lands ceded to the United States, the
tribes generally gave up their territorial sovereignty, though they
retained their sovereignty over the territory they reserved.
Examples of express congressional limitations on tribal
sovereignty after the treaty making period ended in 1870 include
the Dawes Act of 1887-the centerpiece legislation of the
allotment era.164 The Dawes Act was perhaps the single most
disastrous piece of legislation affecting tribal sovereignty because
it resulted in a vast taking of Indian land within affected reserva-
tions. 165 The Act provided a mechanism under which the original
allotments would be held in trust for a period of twenty-five years.
The individual tribal members who owned the allotments then were
deemed competent to manage the land and obtained fee patent
interests subject to state jurisdiction. 66 In reality, after the indi-
vidual trust allotments went out of trust status, they were in many
cases sold to non-Indians, resulting in a further diminishment of the
tribal land base. Even though the allotment policy failed and was
rejected long ago with the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934,167 the Dawes Act had its effect, and continues to
create jurisdictional problems for affected Indian tribes.
Another example of an express congressional limitation on the
exercise of tribal sovereignty is Public Law 280168 under which
Congress gave the courts of six states criminal and civil jurisdiction
over certain causes of action arising within designated Indian
reservations, and created a mechanism for other states to assume
jurisdiction in Indian Country. Public Law 280 was passed during
the termination era, but was amended in 1968 to require tribal
consent to the assumption of state court jurisdiction, as well as give
164 General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)).
165 COHEN, supra note 8, at 138.
166 COHEN, supra note 8, at 131.
167 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified and
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
168 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (§ 7 repealed and reenacted
as amended 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C.
§ 1321-1326 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
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states the authority to retrocede their jurisdiction back to the
tribes.
69
Other examples of express congressional limitations of tribal
sovereignty are the Indian Civil Rights Act, 7 ° which imposed
certain requirements similar to those contained in the Constitution's
Bill of Rights upon Indian tribal governments; the Indian Major
Crimes Act,"' which made it a federal offense for Indians to
commit certain designated major crimes on Indian reservations; and
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,'72 which placed federal
restrictions upon an Indian tribe's right to conduct and regulate
casino-type gambling. 173
Since the dawn of the modern era of self-determination,
however, with few exceptions Congress has refused to expressly
limit the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Ironically, in the last two
decades the Supreme Court has failed to follow Congress' lead in
this respect. The so-called implied limitations on tribal sovereignty
(i.e., the implicit limitations resulting from the tribes' status as
domestic dependent nations subject to the overriding authority of
the federal government) are generally judicially imposed and are
more difficult to define with any clarity. These implied limitations
are judicially created by the Court under the guise of interpreting
treaties and congressional statutes as "implicitly" diminishing tribal
sovereignty. Most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has
diminished tribal sovereignty by implication have involved a tribe's
relations with non-Indians:
169 COHEN, supra note 8, at 362-63.
170 Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (1968) (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994)).
' Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1994)). The Major Crimes Act
was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883), holding that federal courts did not have jurisdiction over
the murder of a Brule Sioux Indian on a reservation by another Sioux.
172 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
173 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
had provisions limiting tribal sovereignty, they were also narrowly drawn with
the dual goals of protecting and promoting tribal sovereignty. See 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2702; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-66 (1978).
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Those cases in which the Court has found a tribe's sover-
eignty [implicitly] divested generally are those involving
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of
the tribe. For example, Indian tribes cannot freely alienate
their lands to non-Indians, cannot enter directly into
commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations,
and cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
in tribal courts.174
The first two of the above noted limitations are an outgrowth
of the discovery doctrine adopted in Johnson v. M'Intosh.175 The
notion is that upon coming under the power and protection of the
United States, the independent authority of the tribes to transfer
their lands to anyone other than the United States, or to deal
directly with nations other than the United States, was inconsistent
with the overriding interests of the federal government and was
therefore implicitly lost as a result of the tribes' "dependent
status.' 76 Historically, these were the only real implicit limita-
tions on the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Beginning in 1978,
however, the Supreme Court began to expand the implicit limita-
tions on tribal sovereignty, beginning with the third limitation noted
above, and the Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe.1
77
In Oliphant, the Court held that tribal courts could not assert
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed crimes on
the reservation. 178 Mark Oliphant was a non-Indian arrested by
the Suquamish tribal police during the tribe's annual Chief Seattle
Days celebration, and charged with assaulting a police officer and
resisting arrest. Oliphant was incarcerated in lieu of $200 bail but
174 Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 426 (1989).
175 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The latter limitation on tribal power to
freely alienate land was codified by Congress in a series of trade and intercourse
acts in 1796, 1799 and 1802. It effectively prohibits the sale of Indian land to
private persons, as well as other sovereigns, without Congress' approval. See 25
U.S.C. § 177 (1994).
176 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
1' 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
178 Id. at 212.
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later released on his own recognizance by the tribal court.179 The
events that led to Oliphant's arrest occurred at the tribal camp
grounds at a time when a number of tribal members were en-
camped for the celebration. Daniel Belgarde, another non-Indian
resident of the reservation, was also arrested by tribal police and
charged with reckless endangerment and injury to tribal property
after a high speed chase through the reservation ended when he
collided with a tribal police vehicle.18 ° Belgarde posted bail and
was released.181 Both Oliphant and Belgarde applied for a writ of
habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act, arguing that the
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 82 Oliphant's
case reached the Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit upheld
tribal jurisdiction.1 83 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ostensibly based on two
factors.
First, the Court cited a concern for protecting non-Indian
citizens from "unwarranted intrusions on their personal liber-
ty. 184 As separate sovereigns whose existence predates the
Constitution, Indian tribes do not have to accord the full protections
of the Bill of Rights to criminal defendants.1 85 The Court was
thus concerned about requiring citizens to submit to the criminal
jurisdiction of tribal courts without these protections. Yet Oliphant
came along ten years after Congress virtually eliminated this
concern by enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act.1 86 The Act
mandates that tribes accord persons the same basic protections in
criminal proceedings as are contained in the Bill of Rights. 187
Under the Act, tribes may not incarcerate any person for over one
179 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
180 id.
181 435 U.S. at 194.
182 Id.
183 544 F.2d at 1009.
'84 435 U.S. at 209-10.
181 Id. at 199 n.8.
186 Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (1968) (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994)).
187 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
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year for any offense.18 8 More importantly, the Act gives any
person the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to
test the legality of the detention by any tribal court.'89 These
provisions mitigate, if not eliminate, the concern for the protection
of personal liberty in Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
A second rationale for the decision in Oliphant was referred to
by Justice Rehnquist as a "commonly shared presumption of
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal
courts do not have the power to try non-Indians."' 90 The histori-
cal evidence used to support this assumption was shaky at best and
has been much criticized.' 91
The Court in Oliphant therefore rested its holding on two
primary factors: the perceived assumption by all three branches of
government that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
and the concern for protecting non-Indians from potential violations
of their civil rights. 192 However, these concerns are not present
when it comes to the exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians in Indian Country. The traditional view, held by the federal
government, is that "Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians in which the tribes
have a significant interest."' 193 Thus, despite Oliphant's limitations
on criminal jurisdiction, the Court has continued to recognize the
proposition that tribal sovereignty has a significant territorial
188 Id. § 1302(7).
'19 Id. § 1303.
190 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
191 See, e.g., Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating
Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 353
(1994); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1595-1599
(1996); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater
Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391 (1993).
'92 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
193 Id. at 153 (citing 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1881)).
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component.' 94 The Court has, therefore, not extended Oliphant
beyond questions of criminal jurisdiction. 95
On the other hand, the alienation of Indian land to non-Indians
within reservation boundaries, which primarily came as a result of
the allotment policy, has led to a significant exception to the
exercise of the broad civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. It is this
judicially created limitation on a tribe's territorial sovereignty that
presents the biggest threat to tribes. Three years after Oliphant, the
Supreme Court decided Montana v. United States.19 6 The Court
held in Montana that as a result of the General Allotment Act and
consequent alienation of tribal land to non-Indians, Indian tribes
have, subject to two exceptions, generally been divested of their
authority to regulate non-Indians on non-Indian fee land, even
though the conduct occurs within the boundaries of the tribe's
reservation.197 This is, perhaps, the greatest tragedy that resulted
from Congress' failed attempt to allot Indian reservations. It has
essentially created a confusing checkerboard pattern of state/tribal
jurisdiction on allotted reservations, depending on land ownership,
and has been a nightmare for tribal law enforcement in Indian
Country.
Ironically, Montana was decided only six years after Congress
passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
of 1975,198 and long after the allotment policy itself had been
repudiated. In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Tribe had
been implicitly divested of the authority to prohibit non-Indians
from hunting and fishing on non-Indian owned reservation land on
the Big Horn River, which flowed through the reservation. The
Court held that this implicit loss of tribal sovereignty came by
virtue of the General Allotment Act and the Crow Allotment Act
enacted pursuant to the General Allotment Act, which resulted in
'94 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142 (1982).
'9' See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 854
(1985).
196 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
197 450 U.S. at 557-67. See infra text accompanying notes 201-202
(discussing exceptions).
198 Pub. L. 96-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-
458e (1994)).
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the alienation of the land in question to non-Indians.' 99 While
recognizing that the tribe's authority to regulate the conduct of
non-Indians on Indian owned land remained very broad and
exclusive, the Court declined to recognize the tribe's general
sovereignty over land within the reservation which had been
transferred in fee to non-Indians. 200 Tribal sovereignty in Mon-
tana, then, was essentially equated with land ownership.
The two exceptions to the general rule announced in Montana
are easy to state but difficult to apply. The Court in Montana
recognized that even on non-Indian fee land, tribes still retain
jurisdiction when a nontribal-member enters into "consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members" or when the non-
member's conduct on reservation fee land directly affects the
tribe's "political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare." 20 At first glance, these exceptions seem significant, and
indeed are significant if applied consistently with the Court's other
cases. 20 2 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has enunciated no
clear test to apply in determining whether a non-member's conduct
on fee lands comes within one of these exceptions. In Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, four
of the nine justices indicated that the impact to the tribe's political
integrity, economic security or health or welfare must be "demon-
strably serious" and must "imperil" these interests.0 3 Two other
justices concurred with the result, but did not indicate whether or
not they agreed with this analysis. 21 Consequently, since Mon-
tana, lower courts and tribal governments have had to guess at
whether jurisdiction exists over non-Indian activities on fee land,
199 Montana, 450 U.S. at 559.
200 Id. at 563-65.
201 Id. at 565-66.
202 See Brendale v. Confederated Banks of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 448-59 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
203 492 U.S. at 431. The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
204 Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and numerous disputes have arisen over the assertion of tribal
sovereignty in such cases, resulting in a great deal of litigation.2 °5
In Brendale, the Supreme Court purported to apply the
Montana rule in two opinions, neither of which garnered a
majority. At issue was whether the Yakima Nation had been
implicitly divested of its sovereign authority to enforce tribal
zoning laws against non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands in two
different areas of the reservation. The "open area" of the reserva-
tion had been opened to non-Indian settlement after allotment. As
a result, almost half of the land in the area was owned in fee by
non-members. 206 The "closed area" of the reservation consisted
primarily of Indian trust land, with a few non-Indian landowners.
Access to the closed area was restricted to tribal members and
landowners of record. A majority of the Court joined in that
portion of Justice White's opinion stating that the tribe was
implicitly divested of its authority to apply its zoning laws to non-
Indian fee land in the open area.2 7 A majority also joined Justice
Stevens' opinion stating that the tribe retained its authority to apply
its zoning laws to non-Indians in the closed area.20 8
Brendale was followed by South Dakota v. Bourland, in which
the Court held that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe was divested
of its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians in an
area within the tribe's reservation that had been acquired in fee by
the United States for the operation of a dam and reservoir.20 9 The
flood control statutes at issue in Bourland specifically authorized
the taking of tribal land for the dam and reservoir. The Court held
that the loss of tribal jurisdiction was implicit in the taking statutes
authorizing the alienation of the former Indian lands to the United
205 See, e.g., County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998);
Montana v. United States EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
275 (1998); Enlow v. Moore, 134 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 1998); Lower Brule Sioux
Tribe v. South Dakota, 104 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 64
(1997); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996);
Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1103 (1995).
206 Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415-16.
207 Id. at 421-33.
208 Id. at 433-48.
209 508 U.S. 679, 680-81 (1993).
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States.21° The purpose of the federal taking statutes was to open
the area for the general recreational use of the public, including
hunting and fishing, subject to federal regulation.2 11 Although the
Cheyenne River Act gave the tribe and its members free access to
the shoreline and the right to hunt and fish in the taken area, the
right was "subject... to regulations governing the corresponding
use by other citizens of the United States. 212 The alienation of
tribal land under the statutes thus resulted in the loss of regulatory
authority over non-Indians in the taken area under Montana. The
Court then remanded the case for a determination of whether the
tribe could assert jurisdiction under either of the two Montana
exceptions. 13
Most recently, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Supreme Court
relied on Montana and held that tribal courts cannot exercise civil
jurisdiction over an action between non-Indians for actions arising
on state highways crossing Indian trust land within reserva-
tions.2 1' The Court in Strate treated the state highway as equiva-
lent to fee land for purposes of applying Montana.1 5 While the
Montana, Brendale and Bourland decisions all found that Congress
had expressed its intent, albeit implicitly, to limit tribal sovereignty
either by the Allotment Act or by legislation authorizing the taking
of reservation land for federal purposes, Strate relied on no such
Act of Congress. Instead, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court found that the tribes' lack of jurisdiction was established by
"our case law.",2 16
As a result of these four cases and the Supreme Court's liberal
use of the so-called implicit limitations upon tribal sovereignty, the
clarity of Worcester has been abandoned. The Supreme Court has
210 Id. at 689-91.
211 Id. at 689-90.
212 Id. at 690.
213 Id. at 695-96. On remand, the Eighth Circuit held that the tribe could not
regulate under either Montana exception. South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868,
870 (8th Cir. 1994).
214 520 U.S. 438, 442, 459 (1997).
215 Id. at 455-56. The Court's decision to do so is extremely questionable.
See infra pp. 56-57.
216 Id. at 445.
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essentially taken on the role of Congress and assumed the authority
to decide when to modify or abrogate a tribe's treaty protected
sovereignty. In all four of the cases discussed above, the Court in
effect reversed the historic presumption against the loss of tribal
sovereignty established by Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee
cases-a presumption that essentially held that Indian tribes retain
all attributes of their sovereign authority over lands which consti-
tute their reservation, unless Congress explicitly limits the exercise
of that sovereignty by treaty or statute.217 In contrast, the Court
in the Montana line of cases ruled that Indian tribes whose land
has been alienated in fee to non-Indians are presumed to lack
jurisdiction to regulate the lands or the conduct of non-Indians
thereon unless Congress has expressly conferred such authority by
statute or treaty, or unless one of the two exceptions identified by
the Montana Court are present. However, in none of the four cases
did the Court articulate any reason why the exercise of civil
jurisdiction is inconsistent with the overriding interest of the United
States, the true test for determining whether tribal sovereignty has
been implicitly divested.218
At the other end of the spectrum are cases like Williams v.
Lee,219 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation,22 ° Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,22' New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,2  and Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez. 3 In all these cases, the Court upheld tribal sover-
eignty and was careful not to find an implicit loss of sovereignty
unless Congress made its intention unmistakably clear. These cases
217 See Brendale v. Confederated Banks of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 455-57 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
218 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
219 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
220 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
221 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
222 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
223 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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are directly at odds with the way Brendale, Bourland, and Strate
construe Montana.224
Merrion was decided only two years after Montana. The Court
held that the tribe retained its sovereign authority to tax non-
Indians conducting activity on tribal land which the non-Indians
leased for oil and gas development.225 Unlike Montana, the Court
refused to presume the loss of tribal sovereignty by implication.
Instead, relying on Colville, decided one year prior to Montana, the
Court recognized that "a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty
itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions
that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent. 2 2' 6 The Court found no "'clear indications' that
Congress [had] implicitly deprived the Tribe of its power to impose
the severance tax" against the leased lands. 7 Moreover, if there
"were ambiguity on this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe,
for 'ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in
order to comport with ... traditional notions of sovereignty and
with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence."
228
In Santa Clara, the Court held that while Congress in the
Indian Civil Rights Act imposed certain obligations on tribal
governments similar to the Bill of Rights, the Act did not authorize
a cause of action in federal court to remedy their violation. The
Court implied that such a cause of action would intrude upon the
tribe's sovereignty beyond that which Congress expressly autho-
rized. 9
In Mescalero Apache, the Court held that New Mexico had no
jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on the
Mescalero Apache Reservation, because the exercise of such
224 See Brendale v. Confederated Banks of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 450-56 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the anomaly created between Montana and the Court's other Indian
law jurisprudence).
225 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144, 159.
226 Id. at 149 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980); Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60).
227 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152.
228 Id. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
143-44 (1980)).
229 436 U.S. at 65-72.
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jurisdiction was preempted by the comprehensive set of tribal
hunting and fishing laws approved by the federal government. 3 '
The Court recognized that "tribes retain any aspect of their
historical sovereignty not 'inconsistent with the overriding interests
of the National Government.' ' 231 This historic sovereignty includ-
ed the "power to manage the use of [their] territory and resources
by both members and nonmembers ... to undertake and regulate
economic activity within the reservation ... and to defray the cost
of governmental services by levying taxes. 232 The Court also
recognized that "the sovereignty retained by the Tribe under the
Treaty of 1852 includes its right to regulate the use of its resources
by [tribal] members as well as non-members. 233
Williams v. Lee was decided in 1959, before Montana and its
progeny muddied the waters. Not surprisingly, Williams remains
true to the foundational principles laid out by Chief Justice
Marshall in the Cherokee cases. The Williams Court held that
Arizona state courts lacked jurisdiction over a case brought by a
non-Indian merchant against a tribal member for nonpayment of
goods purchased on the Navajo Indian Reservation.3 The Court
stated that implicit in the Navajo treaty, which "set apart" as a
"permanent home" a reservation for the Navajos, was "the
understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained
exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government
existed., 235 The Court further reasoned:
[T]o allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reserva-
tion affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
230 462 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1983).
231 462 U.S. at 332 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 153).
232 Id. at 335-36.
233 Id. at 337. The Court distinguished Montana on the ground that Montana
involved tribal regulation of non-Indian fee land, whereas the land on the
Mescalero Reservation was all tribally owned trust land. Id. at 330-31. Merrion
also involved the assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal trust
land leased to non-Indians. After Strate, however, the distinction becomes less
clear. See infra notes 238-239 and accompanying text (discussing the Strate
decision).
234 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
235 Id. at 221-22.
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Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that [the
merchant] is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and
the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases
in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservations. Congress
recognized this authority in the Navajos in the treaty of
1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be
taken from them, it is for Congress to do it.
236
Unlike its decision in Montana, the Williams Court did not
consider it relevant whether the reservation land upon which the
non-Indian store sat was Indian or non-Indian owned. Instead, the
Court focused on the fact that the non-Indian's conduct "occurred
on the reservation" and the "transaction with an Indian took place
there. 2 37 More important, underlying the Court's decision was
the express recognition that the "internal affairs" of an Indian tribe
can involve non-Indians when the conduct of non-Indians has an
effect on the tribe or its members.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, and subse-
quent holdings in Martinez, Merrion and Mescalero Apache, the
Court in Strate made the broad and erroneous assertion that "our
case law establishes that, absent express authorization by federal
statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers
exists only in limited circumstances. '23 8 To support this broad
assertion, Justice Ginsburg relied primarily on Oliphant and
Montana.239 Justice Ginsburg was undoubtedly influenced by the
statement in Montana that the "exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
236 Id. at 223.
237 Id.
238 Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). Even more
troublesome is the fact that the Court in Strate treated the land upon which the
accident occurred as alienated fee land, even though the cause of action arose on
a highway easement across tribal trust land. The Court did so in order to apply
the Montana presumption against tribal jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying
notes 199-200).
239 Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation."'" The statement is directly at odds with the above
quoted passage of Williams, even though the Montana Court cites
Williams to support its own statement. 24 1 How can one reconcile
these two seemingly inconsistent approaches to tribal sovereignty?
As a practical matter, one cannot, without looking at the particular
facts of each case involving non-Indians.
An analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions following
Williams, particularly those decided since 1978, indicates that there
are no clearcut rules under which the Supreme Court determines
whether tribal sovereignty in cases involving non-Indians has been
implicitly diminished. While tribal authority over the conduct of
tribal members remains broad and exclusive, tribal authority over
nonmembers on reservation land, particularly non-Indian owned fee
land, is increasingly restricted. The Supreme Court has essentially
developed two inconsistent lines of case law. One, led by Williams,
respects congressional authority in the area of tribal sovereignty
and presumes against any loss of territorial sovereignty absent
express congressional legislation.242  The other, initiated by
Montana, ignores and reverses the presumption in favor of the loss
of territorial sovereignty.2 43 This inconsistency essentially allows
the Supreme Court to decide a case involving tribal sovereignty
arbitrarily based upon the Court's own subjective belief as to what
the law should be.2"
The result is a great deal of frustration for Indian tribes, and the
legitimate claim that the Supreme Court's decisions in Montana
and its progeny have simply become another example of a long
history of the federal government's abrogation of their historic
240 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
241 Id. (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20).
242 See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal
authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important
part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies
in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute.") (citations omitted).
243 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445.
244 See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1575
(1996).
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treaty rights. The Supreme Court's activism in this regard is
particularly ironic in light of the fairly consistent congressional
policy aimed at promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government
since 1970, one which is currently embraced by the Clinton
administration.245
The Supreme Court formerly was the greatest protector of tribal
sovereignty because its Justices took the time to read and under-
stand history. However, as evidenced in its decisions in Montana,
Brendale, Bourland and Strate, the Court today is dominated by
judicial thinking that essentially ignores the historical basis of tribal
sovereignty and continues to depart from the foundational
principles established by Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee
cases. Unfortunately, today's Supreme Court has seen fit to take on
the role of policy maker, a role traditionally left to Congress and
the Executive Branch.
III. THE FUTURE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
In light of Strate, the current trend in the Supreme Court is
apparently to limit tribal sovereignty over non-Indians on reserva-
tion lands. The Court has undertaken an ad hoc subjective approach
to analyzing issues of tribal sovereignty; in most cases deciding the
issue not based upon the tribes' historic territorial sovereignty, but
rather upon the Supreme Court Justices' own beliefs of what the
"current state of affairs ought to be. 246 The result of this ad hoc
approach to applying the Montana rule and its exceptions has been
the creation of a body of law that has become extremely
unpredictable. For example, lower courts have held on the one hand
that an Indian tribe retains the power to regulate non-Indians use
of water on non-Indian lands within the reservation.247 On the
other hand, lower courts have also held that an Indian tribe cannot
245 See supra notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
246 Getches, supra note 244, at 1575.
247 Montana v. United States EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 275 (1998).
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provide a judicial forum for its own members who are injured or
even killed by non-Indian motorists crossing the reservation.248
What, if anything, can be done to correct this current trend in
the Supreme Court? The answer is fairly simple. The Court must
recognize and understand the historic and doctrinal basis of tribal
sovereignty. The Court must recognize, as it did in Merrion and
Martinez, that when it undertakes to diminish sovereignty by
implication, it is in reality abrogating historic treaty rights. In their
treaties, the tribes reserved the right to occupy and govern what
remained of their territory as they saw fit, subject only to the
power of Congress. The Supreme Court must also give proper
deference to the current policy of Congress, which has been
unwavering since the early 1970s, to promote and encourage tribal
self-government, even when the actual exercise of that self-
government involves non-Indians within the territorial bounds of
the reservation.
From a more practical standpoint, tribal governmental officials
must recognize that with the power to exercise sovereignty comes
the duty to exercise that power fairly and in a manner which
comports with this nation's concepts of due process of law and
fundamental fairness. Tribal governments must continue to work
diligently to establish a system of government, including strong
tribal court systems, responsive to the rights and needs of its own
citizens and as well to non-Indian residents and visitors. Many
positive steps in this direction have been made in the past.249 The
federal government must continue to encourage and support tribes
in their efforts to achieve not only self-determination and strong
tribal government, but eventual self-sufficiency. Navigating the
road to tribal self-determination and self-sufficiency demands
patience on the part of everyone. If, indeed, tribal governments lag
behind federal, state and local governments in this area, it is due
primarily to the failure of the federal government to follow a
248 Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1516 (1998); Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 996 F. Supp. 1269 (D.
Mont. 1998).
249 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on S.1691 Before the Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 6 (1998) (testimony of David Kwail, President, Inter-
Tribal Council of Arizona).
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consistent policy of encouraging and promoting tribal sovereignty
in the last 200 years. Modem tribal governments have not been
afforded the luxury of time to perfect their systems, as have state
and local governments.
The Court's recent decision in Strate is particularly alarming
for tribes and the future of tribal sovereignty. Initially, the implicit
limitations on the exercise of tribal territorial sovereignty were
generally aimed at the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands
which had been sold or transferred in fee to non-Indians or the
state or federal government. The Court in Strate, however, virtually
ignored fundamental principles of property law and equated a
public highway easement that the tribe and Bureau of Indian
Affairs had granted over tribal trust land with alienated fee land.
Thus, the Court was able to circumvent its own previous rule that
tribal authority over non-Indian activities on trust land remains
generally broad and exclusive. No legal basis exists to equate a
mere possessory property interest with the absolute alienation of
Indian land in fee simple. The Court's ruling calls into question
tribal jurisdiction over a good deal of reservation land inasmuch as
many Indian tribes have leased tribal land to non-Indians for
economic development. Leases, like easements, grant limited
property interests, and the question now is whether or not the
Supreme Court will continue its quest to erode tribal sovereignty
on leased lands as well as easements, and thus will continue to
reverse the historical legal presumption against the implicit loss of
tribal sovereign authority.
What is particularly ironic and frustrating to Indian tribes and
their advocates is that the Supreme Court is currently engaging in
a campaign to divest tribes of their territorial sovereignty, while
Congress and the Executive Branch promote tribal sovereignty,
self-sufficiency, and economic development. Indian tribes can
neither be sovereign nor self-sufficient if their authority is limited
to activities that involve their own members, unless we choose to
isolate these tribes from engaging in commerce with non-Indians.
Such isolation would, of course, frustrate the tribes' ability to
promote economic development on reservation lands, and ultimate-
ly frustrate the federal policies favoring self-sufficiency, economic
development and strong tribal government.
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Perhaps the best illustration of the dichotomy created by the
Court comes when one compares the Court's recent decision in
Strate with Congress' recent enactment of the Tribal Justice
Support Act. On the one hand, Justice Ginsburg stated in Strate
that "[o]ur case law establishes that, absent express authorization
by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of
non-members exists only in limited circumstances. 250 Some
lower courts have interpreted Strate as establishing nearly an
insurmountable presumption against tribal jurisdiction.25' On the
other hand, Congress, in the Tribal Justice Support Act of 1993,
expressly found not only that the United States has a trust
responsibility to protect the sovereignty of tribal governments, but
that tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the adjudication of disputes involving both Indians and
non-Indians alike.252 The legislative history of the Tribal Justice
Support Act supports the exercise of sovereignty over non-Indians,
regardless of whether their conduct occurs on Indian land, non-
Indian land or easements. The Senate reports accompanying the Act
expressly noted that tribal judicial systems are permanent institu-
tions "charged with resolving the rights and interests of both Indian
and non-Indian individuals. 253 Similarly, the House Report
expressed Congress' opinion that tribal courts properly "exercise
civil jurisdiction within their territory" over Indians and non-
Indians alike.254
The Court in Strate never mentioned the Tribal Justice Support
Act, even though the United States cited the Act throughout their
amicus brief in support of the tribes. Nor has the Supreme Court
ever articulated a logical reason for ignoring the historical
presumption, first established by Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester, that Indian tribes retain every attribute of their territorial
sovereignty unless Congress expressly and unequivocally takes it
250 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
251 See supra note 248.
252 Pub. L. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601
(1994)).
253 S. REP. No. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 65 1978).
254 H.R. REP. No. 103-205, at 8-9 (1993).
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away from them by statute or treaty. At some point in the near
future the Court must clarify the dichotomy it has created, and
explain how, if at all, both Montana and Strate can be reconciled
with Williams, Merrion, Mescalero Apache and, ultimately, over
"150 years of Indian law jurisprudence. 2 55
Though the current trend in Congress has been to uphold the
territorial integrity of tribal sovereignty and to continue to promote
strong tribal governments, there are some members of Congress
who, like the Rehnquist Court, are actively engaged in a campaign
to divest the Indian tribes of their sovereignty. Bills have recently
been introduced that would require Indian tribes to waive their
sovereign immunity, and that would expressly divest Indian tribes
of sovereign authority over non-Indians in certain circumstances.
Many of these provisions have been attached as riders to appropria-
tion and other bills, in order to avoid the hearing process and
prevent tribes and their advocates from testifying before Congress
in opposition. While these members have generally been unsuccess-
ful in swaying the tide in Congress against tribal sovereignty, there
are an alarming number of people in Congress who are leaning
toward the minority view.
255 South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 699 n.2 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The Court seems to have limited the effect of Strate when it recently
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
136 F.3d 610 (9th Cir.), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1998). El Paso involved a
civil nuclear tort action by tribal members against a non-Indian mining company
that leased tribal trust land on the Navajo Reservation for uranium mining. The
mining company sued to enjoin the tribal court from asserting jurisdiction. The
Ninth Circuit held that the mining company was required to exhaust its tribal
court remedies prior to seeking federal review of the tribal court's jurisdiction
over the action. 136 F.3d at 613-15, 617-20. In the course of its holding, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Strate. Id. at 618 n.5. The Supreme Court vacated on
the ground that the action was preempted by the "unusual preemption provision"
of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh), under which Congress
expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum to adjudicate such
actions. El Paso, 119 S. Ct. at 1437. In a narrow holding, the Court rejected the
argument that tribal jurisdiction was foreclosed on the broader grounds discussed
in Strate. The Court distinguished Strate as an action "arising on state highways"
and indicated that Strate did not apply to actions which "occurred on tribal
[lands]" even though the land at issue was leased to non-Indians. Id. at 1436 n.4
(citing El Paso, 136 F.3d at 618 n.5).
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There are a number of theories as to why these voices of
dissent are becoming louder in Congress. The recent trend in the
Supreme Court to limit tribal sovereignty in areas that involve non-
Indians has given the traditionally anti-Indian forces in Congress
fuel to fire their efforts at terminating sovereignty and, ultimately,
any treaty rights which remain. There is also a political backlash
against Indian gaming which has turned many old eastern allies
against Indian tribes and sovereignty. In particular, the rise of
gaming in the eastern part of the United States and the fact that
some tribes have become wealthy as a result of the location of their
reservations close to metropolitan areas, has conveyed the notion
that this country's Indian tribes are becoming alarmingly rich from
gaming. Although, in reality relatively few tribes have actually
generated a substantial amount of revenue from gaming, the mere
illusion has caused a tremendous backlash, which has carried
beyond gaming into other areas of Indian law.
Another reason for the political backlash is that Indian tribes
are becoming more active in asserting their jurisdiction, through
ordinances imposing taxes and regulatory requirements on the
reservation. Tribal courts are increasingly asserting jurisdiction over
the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation, in part because tribal
courts are the mechanism by which the tribal regulatory laws are
enforced. In many cases, this results in conflict between tribes and
reservation non-Indians, who then complain to Congress and
generally wage political campaigns against sovereignty there and
in the media.
Despite these factors, the challenge for policymakers, lawyers
and judges is to remember the lessons of the past and not repeat
them. Reversing the current policy of promoting tribal sovereignty
and self-government will only repeat past failures. Simply because
Indian tribes, just now becoming active in asserting their political
and legal authority, may sometimes assert that authority in a
manner which creates controversy or disagreement among non-
Indians does not mean that their authority should be taken away,
either by the courts or Congress. It must be remembered that tribal
sovereignty as a historical legal concept finds support in this
nation's early treaties. Most of these treaties were used by the
United States to obtain the vast amount of territory in the United
States to which the tribes had a prior claim. At the same time, in
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return for giving up their title to the lands ceded, the tribes
obtained reservations of land as their remaining homeland, within
which they reserved their historic sovereignty. Any diminishment
of their territorial sovereignty, whether by congressional act or
judicial decision, is tantamount to another broken promise by the
United States.
Justice Black said in his dissent in Federal Power Commission
v. Tuscarora Indian Nation that "Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word."2" 6 By sustaining a real policy, both legal
and political, of promoting and enforcing tribal sovereignty in
Indian Country, the United States is simply keeping the promises
of its ancestors. Any retreat from that policy, currently recognized
in Congress and the Executive Branch, if not the Supreme Court,
will have tragic consequences for the tribes, as history teaches.
More significantly, it will also render the United States government
susceptible to criticism from foreign countries, and result in the
loss of credibility of the United States in its campaign to promote
human rights world-wide. Politically speaking, tribal sovereignty
and the treaty rights of this country's native people are just as
much issues of basic human rights as they are legal and political
issues. The history of this country's taking of Indian
lands-engaging in an active campaign at times to exterminate
Indian people through the spread of diseased blankets, the destruc-
tion of the once great buffalo herds upon which many tribes
depended for survival, and outright warfare and bounty hunting-
provides illuminating examples of this country's own weakness
when it comes to basic human rights. The United States' moral, if
not legal, obligation is to enforce the historical treaties that this
country executed with America's first nations.
Since President Nixon's historic address to Congress in 1970,
the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination Act in 1975, and
the subsequent enactment of numerous legislation promoting tribal
sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and economic development, Congress
has been on the right path. If Congress were to once again reverse
this policy as urged by a minority of its members, it will simply
stand as another example of a violation of the native peoples'
256 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
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human rights, their treaty rights and their historical right to exist as
unique cultural, political and sovereign nations within this nation.
Neither this country's diplomats nor its presidents will ever again
be able to travel overseas and preach human rights to the other
nations of this earth without appearing hypocritical.
On the other hand, Indian tribes must continue to lobby
Congress to ensure that their side of the dispute is always consid-
ered and that Congress and state and local policymakers have the
benefit of the tribes' own views as to how and why tribal sover-
eignty is so important. Moreover, Indian tribal governments have
their own responsibility to exercise their sovereignty so that non-
Indian citizens of the United States are not threatened. Indian tribes
as governments must recognize that with the increased exercise of
their sovereignty over non-Indians comes the duty to exercise that
sovereignty fairly and responsibly utilizing procedures and
safeguards with which non-Indians are familiar. Judges and
lawmakers are constantly viewing the actions of Indian tribes
through a microscope, and many continue to look for legal
justifications to place additional limitations on sovereignty.
State and federal governments must also realize that it has not
been all that long since President Nixon's speech to Congress in
1970 ushered in the current federal policy of encouraging and
promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government. It would be
tragic to stray from that policy before Indian tribes have been given
a legitimate chance to even begin to build a modern institution of
local government, to make and correct their own mistakes along the
way, and to exercise that which is their historic and legal right.
CONCLUSION
Although the current federal policy is aimed at supporting tribal
sovereignty, it has not been that long since the days of termination.
Tribal governments can never become stable when the federal
government keeps changing the rules every twenty-five years or so.
The failure of the federal government to adhere to a consistent
policy toward the Indian tribes has had a devastating impact. No
one can dispute that this country's Indian Nations had their
traditional cultural, social, religious, and political systems all but
torn down by policies of assimilation and termination. And yet
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somehow these Nations were able to cling to the core of their
existence, the fundamental cultural values that defined them as a
separate distinct people. With the reemergence of the federal
government's policy of self-government following the Termination
Era of the 1950s, tribes were able to resume the rebuilding process
that began in 1934-a process that remains ongoing.
If history teaches us anything, it is that the only federal Indian
policy which can be justified, the only policy which is consistent
with the historic treaty obligations of the United States, and the
only policy which native people themselves will support, is a
policy which respects and enforces Indian treaties and promotes
tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Indian people have and
will always fight any government attempt to take their land, their
cultural values, and their sovereignty. That is why all three
branches of government must support and promote a policy of
tribal self-government. Indian tribes today must be given sufficient
time and the resources to perfect a modern system of government,
one which will fit each tribes' unique social and cultural needs and
at the same time provide the required safeguards which non-Indians
expect. The United States must respect the historic treaty rights and
must not only recognize, but actively enforce, the notion that the
tribes reserved their sovereignty in these treaties.
Congressmen, lawyers, and judges must never examine tribal
sovereignty without understanding its history. They must always
realize that tribal sovereignty is rooted not only in the history of
this country, but in the Constitution and the numerous treaties this
nation executed with Indian tribes before it became the super
power it is today. It seems that the United States must periodically
be reminded of its historic commitments to the tribes. The
observation of Vine Deloria, Jr. in 1974 on the heels of the Indian
civil rights movement remains forcefully true today:
The contemporary demand of American Indians for a
restoration of the treaty relationship must be seen in this
historical setting. Few tribes would have signed treaties
with the United States had they felt that the United States
would violate them. The promises of self-government
found in a multitude of treaties, the promises of protection
by the United States from wrongs committed by its
citizens, the promises that the tribes would be respected as
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nations on whose behalf the United States acted as a
trustee before the eyes of the world, were all vital parts of
the treaty rights which Indians believe they have received
from the United States.
John Marshall characterized the Cherokees, and by
extension the other Indian tribes, as in a state of tutelage.
The implied meaning of this phrase was that at some
future time the tribes would assume full status as nations
in the world community. There was never an indication
that the tribes were to be destroyed and their individual
members merged into the great American mass as citizens.
The recent series of incidents in Indian country is
based upon a political reading of the treaties and not a
reading of the treaties as symbolic real-estate documents.
The history of the treaty relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes contains a strong tradition
denying that tribes are wards of the government and
describing them as expectant nations with eventual status
as nations in the family of nations of the world.257
The Indian tribes are indeed America's first nations. Their
sovereignty is rooted in the land that they occupied long before the
United States was created. Their existence is inextricably inter-
twined with the history of the creation of the United States and the
westward movement. They continue to occupy their own territory,
promised to them by treaty or legislation. Their efforts to regain
their self-sufficiency and social and cultural well-being as a people,
as nations within a nation, depends upon the continued recognition
by the United States that they have a historical, legal and political
right to exist and to make and enforce their own laws within the
territory they occupy. Until the United States and the states
recognize this fundamental proposition and acknowledge this
country's legal and moral obligation to actively recognize and
protect tribal sovereignty, the road to tribal self-sufficiency will
always be broken.
257 DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 7, at
136-37.
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